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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-1868 
___________ 
 
MARC A. STEPHENS;  
TYRONE K. STEPHENS, 
   Appellants 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF ENGLEWOOD; ENGLEWOOD POLICE DEPARTMENT;  
DET. MARC MCDONALD; DET. DESMOND SINGH;  
DET. CLAUDIA CUBILLOS; DET. SANTIAGO INCLE, JR.;  
NATHANIEL KINLAW, individually and in official capacity;  
NINA C. REMSON, Attorney at Law, LLC; COMET LAW OFFICES LLC 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. No. 2-14-cv-05362) 
District Judge:  Honorable William J. Martini 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 2, 2017 
 
Before:  RESTREPO, SCIRICA and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 3, 2017) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
                                              
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Marc and Tyrone Stephens appeal from three orders of the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey granting summary judgment to the defendants and 
denying reconsideration.  Finding no error, we will affirm. 
 This appeal arises out of several criminal actions instituted against Tyrone 
Stephens, a minor.  In March 2012, Tyrone was charged with theft-related offenses.  
Marc Stephens, Tyrone’s adult brother, retained and paid attorney Nina Remson to 
defend Tyrone.  In June 2012, Tyrone was charged with aggravated assault, and Remson 
took on that representation as well.  Ultimately, Tyrone pleaded guilty.  In this action, the 
Stephenses allege that Remson committed malpractice in the course of this 
representation.  Among other things, they contend that Remson convinced Tyrone to 
plead guilty despite receiving specific instructions from Marc to refuse all plea offers. 
 Tyrone was then arrested in November 2012 in connection with an assault 
committed by several individuals outside a 7-Eleven store a little after 10:00 pm on 
October 31, 2012.  Natalia Cortes, who was a witness to the attack and the cousin of one 
of the victims, identified three of the attackers as Tyrone, Justin Evans, and Derrick 
Gaddy.  Detectives from the Englewood Police Department interviewed Evans, who, 
after initially denying that he was involved, confessed to the crime and also stated that 
Tyrone had been the ringleader.  The detectives then obtained a statement (with Marc 
present) from Tyrone, who denied his involvement.  Marc offered Tyrone an alibi that 
they had been at home together, and Tyrone adopted it.  However, Tyrone later admitted 
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to being in the vicinity of the 7-Eleven — specifically, at a McDonald’s down the street 
— with two different alibi witnesses.  Tyrone was taken into custody and the 
investigation continued. 
The next day, detectives arrested Jahquan Graham and placed him in the holding 
cells in the Bergen County Juvenile Court near Tyrone.  According to Detective Kinlaw, 
he overheard a conversation between Graham and Tyrone.  When Graham asked why he 
was being held, according to Kinlaw, Tyrone stated, “I know why we are here, that 
fucking rat Derek told.  He was brought to the police department and released, he’s the 
only one who wasn’t arrested.”  D.C. dkt. #65-5 at 20. 
Tyrone was charged with multiple crimes, including robbery, aggravated assault, 
and riot.  In December 2012, a trial judge found probable cause on all seven counts of the 
criminal complaint, and then reiterated that finding after a second hearing in February 
2013.  However, at this point, the prosecutor’s case against Tyrone began to unravel.  
First, Cortes, while acknowledging that she had earlier identified Tyrone as a perpetrator, 
testified that she was not actually sure if he was involved.  Second, Evans pleaded guilty 
and then recanted his previous statement implicating Tyrone.  As a result, the prosecutor 
dismissed the indictment with prejudice against Tyrone and he was released from jail.   
The Stephenses filed the complaint at issue here in August 2014.  In addition to 
bringing claims against Remson for her representation, they have raised various claims 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the Englewood detectives, the police 
department, and the City of Englewood.  The defendants moved for summary judgment, 
4 
 
and on November 3, 2015, the District Court granted the motions in full.  The Stephenses 
filed several motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), each of which the District Court denied.  
They then filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review an order granting 
summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard used by the District Court.”  
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000).1 
 The District Court concluded that Remson was entitled to summary judgment 
because the Stephenses failed to comply with New Jersey’s affidavit-of-merit statute.  
This statute requires that, in cases like this one involving allegations of professional 
malpractice, the plaintiff provide an affidavit from an appropriately licensed person 
attesting that there is a “reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised 
or exhibited . . . fell outside acceptable professional or occupational standards.”  N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2A:53A-27; see also Snyder v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 303 F.3d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 
2002) (rule “is enforceable in the district courts when New Jersey law applies”).   
 While the Stephenses argue at length that Remson provided deficient 
representation, they do not meaningfully challenge the District Court’s conclusion that 
their failure to provide an affidavit of merit was fatal to their claims.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. 
                                              
1 We will address only arguments that the Stephenses raised in their opening brief.  See 
United States v. Jackson, 849 F.3d 540, 555 n.13 (3d Cir. 2017).  While the Stephenses 
purport to incorporate by reference the arguments that they asserted in virtually every 
filing that they made in the District Court, “[t]his is insufficient to preserve an argument 
for appellate review.”  Spitz v. Proven Winners N. Am., LLC, 759 F.3d 724, 731 (7th 
Cir. 2014). 
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§ 2A:53A-29 (the failure to provide the affidavit “shall be deemed a failure to state a 
cause of action”).  They do suggest that their failure was caused by Remson’s delay in 
responding to their discovery requests, but the undisputed evidence reveals that Remson 
provided her entire case file to Marc well before they filed this complaint.  The 
Stephenses have failed to provide any evidence (or even argument) that the discovery 
materials had “a substantial bearing on preparation of the affidavit” such that they would 
be excused from filing the affidavit.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-28; see generally 
Balthazar v. Atl. City Med. Ctr., 816 A.2d 1059, 1066-67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2003).  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of judgment to Remson. 
 Meanwhile, the Stephenses assert false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and malicious-
prosecution claims against the Englewood defendants.  “A finding of probable cause 
is . . . a complete defense” to each of these claims.  Goodwin v. Conway, 836 F.3d 321, 
327 (3d Cir. 2016).  Probable cause “exists when the facts and circumstances within the 
arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person 
to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.”  
Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995).  While probable cause 
requires more than mere suspicion, it does not require the type of evidence needed to 
support a conviction.  See Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 211 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 The facts here, viewed most favorably to the Stephenses, do not create a genuine 
dispute as to whether probable cause existed when Tyrone was arrested.  The defendants 
had three compelling pieces of evidence implicating Tyrone in the attack: (1) the 
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identification by Natalia Cortes; (2) the statement made by Justin Evans that Tyrone had 
participated in the attack; and (3) inconsistencies in testimony regarding Tyrone’s alibi.  
This evidence was more than sufficient to establish probable cause.  See Wilson v. Russo, 
212 F.3d 781, 790 (3d Cir. 2000).   
 While the Stephenses contend that the evidence shows that Tyrone was actually 
half a mile away at a McDonald’s at the time that the assault occurred, the equivocal 
evidence that they present does not dispel the probable cause described above.  See id. at 
792-93; Goodwin, 836 F.3d at 328.  Further, notwithstanding their arguments to the 
contrary, no reasonable juror could conclude that the detectives coerced Evans’s 
statement.  The transcript of the interrogation reveals that Evans’s mother was present the 
entire time (Evans was then nearly 18 years old), he was read his Miranda rights, the 
interrogation lasted for just over an over, and the detectives did not use any particularly 
harsh tactics.  See generally United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.3d 99, 108-09 (3d Cir. 2005); 
Hall v. Thomas, 611 F.3d 1259, 1285-89 (11th Cir. 2010).  Accordingly, we discern no 
error in the District Court’s disposition of the Stephenses’ constitutional claims against 
the detectives.2  And, since they have failed to establish an underlying constitutional 
                                              
2 The Stephenses contend that Detective Kinlaw invented the statement that he said he 
overheard Tyrone make while he was in a holding cell.  However, they presented no 
evidence to support this contention.  See generally Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 
F.3d 595, 608 (3d Cir. 2002).  While this statement is not relevant to the false-arrest 
analysis because it post-dated Tyrone’s arrest, see Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d 595, 
602 (3d Cir. 2005), it does provide still more support for the defendants’ decision to 
charge Tyrone with various offenses.   
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violation, their claims against the police department and Englewood also necessarily fail.  
See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1212 n.26 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 The Stephenses’ state-law claims fare no better.  To make out a claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, they must show that the defendants engaged in 
“intentional and outrageous conduct” that was “so severe that no reasonable person could 
be expected to endure it.”  Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921, 924 (N.J. 2004) (citations, 
alteration omitted).  We have already ruled that a reasonable juror would conclude that 
the officers had probable cause to arrest and charge Tyrone.  Consequently, the 
Stephenses cannot show that the defendants’ conduct in arresting and holding Tyrone was 
outrageous.  See, e.g., Harris v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 776 F.3d 907, 917 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015).  The Stephenses also assert that the detectives committed negligence and 
defamation by telling Justin Evans that Tyrone was under investigation and had 
implicated Evans in the incident, but the record simply does not support that allegation.   
 Finally, we agree with the District Court that any amendment to the complaint 
would have been futile.  See generally Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 
114 (3d Cir. 2002).  And, in light of these rulings, the District Court did not err in 
denying the Stephenses’ Rule 59(e) motions.  See generally Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008); Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. 
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).   
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  We also deny the 
Stephenses’ motion for the recusal of the District Judge, see Securacomm Consulting, 
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Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We have repeatedly stated 
that a party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for 
recusal.”), and their motion for clarification.    
